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Abstract
This paper explores the possibilities for sellers to usefully transmit product infor-
mation to buyers by cheap talk public advertising. We explore two polar cases, con-
trasting vertically di¤erentiated products (à la Milgrom Webers (1982) general sym-
metric model) with horizontally di¤erentiated products (à la Hotellings (1929) line).
We consider both the message only case and where reserve price-message pairs can
be chosen by the seller. For horizontally di¤erentiated products partitional message-
only informative equilibria are shown to exist providing the number of bidders is
su¢ ciently large. The equilibrium is characterized by more precise information pro-
vided for less popular product attributes. The seller optimal disclosure policy displays
a complementarity relationship between the number of bidders and the amount of
product information disclosed. In contrast, for the vertically di¤erentiated products
benchmark, message-only informative equilibria do not exist. With reserve prices,
informative equilibria exist in both cases. For the vertical case these equilibria yield
lower seller revenue than uninformative equilibria. In the horizontal case with su¢ -
ciently large number of bidders higher revenue is possible and full disclosure becomes
feasible and seller optimal in the limit.
Keywords: Cheap Talk; Information Disclosure; Auction; Horizontal Di¤erentia-
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1 Introduction
One of the important contributions in Milgrom and Webers (1982) (hereinafter MW)
seminal paper was to the question of optimal information disclosure. MW showed that in
context of their general symmetric model the ex-ante expected revenue maximizing policy
is to inform buyers as fully as possible. The object of choice of the seller here is the ex-
ante disclosure rule which maps the information which the seller receives to the message
transmitted to buyers. Although this modeling choice ts many economic scenarios, there
are also certainly others in which it is more natural to think of sellers not as choosing a
disclosure rule before they receive their private information, but rather simply trying to
sell what they have. It also appears that in much product advertising the seller seeks to
convey information about the product by vague statements or by imagery which give no
right of legal redress1. In other words, much advertising is cheap-talk in which o¤ the
equilibrium path the informed seller will opportunistically send misleading messages if it
is in her interest to do so.
In general, what information may be transmitted by cheap-talk depends on character-
istics of the joint distribution of valuations of bidders, their private information and the
information available to the seller. This paper explores two important polar cases repre-
senting the benchmark case of vertically di¤erentiated (VD) products à la MWs (1982)
general symmetric model and horizontal di¤erentiated (HD) products à la Hotellings
(1929) line.
To be specic, in this paper, a seller o¤ers a product to a number of ex ante homogenous
bidders in a rst price auction2. We focus on disclosure policies in the form of partitions
over seller information, as is familiar in the literature on cheap-talk (Crawford Sobel
(1982)). Dening the expected auction revenue conditional on a message as the interim
expected revenue, it follows that since under cheap-talk, the seller is not committed to
executing a preset disclosure rule, all the equilibrium interim expected revenues must be
equal otherwise the seller will deviate to report the message that generates the highest
level of expected revenue, regardless of what the real attribute is.
In the benchmark case of VD products, it follows easily from the analysis of MW (1982)
that a message-only informative equilibrium does not exist. This is because bidders share
the same direction of preference for VD products, and the corresponding messages can
also be ranked in terms of their induced interim expected revenues. As a result, the
seller will always announce the message that generates the highest expected revenue, no
1For instance, following a complaint by the FTC of misleading advertising for failure to mention high
sodium content Campbell Soup Co. reverted from a "Soup is good food" campaign and returned to its
"Mm mm good" theme, Abernethy and Franke (1998). Intuitively, one does not expect to see equilibrium
cheap talk adverts of the kind "Mm mm good" when the alternative is "Mm mm bad". But it seems
more plausible to see an image of a child uttering "Mm mm good" when the alternative is an image of a
hungry worker saying "Mm mm good. As Nelson (1974) notes, "advertisements for experience goods are
dominantly soft or indirect information". This contrasts with hard information disclosure Milgrom (1981)
and Grossman (1981) in which the seller must state the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth. And
Celik (2014) considers this sort of information disclosure in a model of horizontally di¤erentiated products.
2Our assumptions will mean that the revenue equivalence theorem holds so our results will hold for any
standard auction.
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matter what the real attribute is, and the revealed information is hence not credible. In
contrast, a fully revealing equilibrium can be sustained in a message-price informative
equilibrium, where setting reserve price message pairs is allowed. However, we show that
this fully revealing informative equilibrium results in lower interim revenue than would
obtain from null information disclosure with optimal reserve price. Therefore, the seller
optimal price-message equilibrium consists of a single reserve price and null message.
The case of HD products leads to a richer set of possibilities. In our model, the
e¤ect of a message about the product attribute on bidder valuations can be decomposed
into two distinct e¤ects. One, which is uniform across bidders, is the risk reduction
e¤ect. That is, providing more precise information reduces the risk of mismatch for all the
bidders, and thus raises their valuations. The other is the idiosyncratic e¤ect of attribute
revelation, if a message shifts the conditional expectation of the product attribute towards
the extremes of the Hotelling line then given our distributional assumptions the product
becomes less popular and the distribution of conditional valuations becomes worse by rst
order stochastic dominance. We thereby show that, in message-only informative equilibria
(without reserve prices) equilibrium partitions must have the property that more precise
information is revealed for less popular product attributes. Only in this way can the risk
reduction e¤ect and attribute revelation e¤ects be balanced to yield equal interim revenue
for all messages.
This necessary condition begs the question of existence. The condition implies that in
an equilibrium with a given partition degree3, it must be possible to divide the Hotelling
line into the given number of intervals each having positions and lengths which are some-
how balanced with each other. Our second result supplies the necessary existence theorem.
We prove that, for each partition degree J , a message-only informative equilibrium can
always be supported by a partition of degree J , as long as the number of bidders is su¢ -
ciently large. Rather than the usual xed-point approach, we apply an Intermediate Value
Theorem dened on partially order sets. Furthermore, we also show that, given the num-
ber of bidders, n, there exists a maximum partition degree below which a message-only
informative equilibrium can be supported, and that maximum partition degree is non-
decreasing in n. And in the limit, when n approaches innity, the equilibrium partition
will converge to a partition where all the messages are of the same level of signal precision.
The intuition for these results is that, with increasing number of bidders, the di¤erence
in popularity across di¤erent product attributes converges to zero, and the di¤erences in
interim expected revenues are increasingly determined by the di¤erence in signal precision.
Therefore, as the popularity across di¤erent attributes become more and more equal it
becomes easier for the seller to adjust the precision of signals to satisfy the equal revenue
conditions. In the limit, when the number of bidders converge to innity and all the
product attributes are of the same level of popularity, the equilibrium partitions will
naturally converge to one where all the messages are of the same signal precision.
3For an interval partition, the degree of partition J is dened as the number of subintervals in the
partition. Roughly speaking, a larger J corresponds to ner partition of the attribute interval, and thus,
on average, more precise information revealed to the bidders.
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Third, we establish a complementarity relationship between the number of bidders
and the optimal amount of information measured by the degree of equilibrium partitions.
That is, when the number of bidders increases, it is better for seller revenue to construct
an informative equilibrium using higher degree partitions. The intuition here is similar to
that behind the existence theorem. When the number of bidders increase, the di¤erence
in popularity across di¤erent product attributes vanishes, and it is easier to construct
informative equilibria using more precise signals, which in turn increase the valuations of
the bidders and thus the expected revenue of the auction. Hence, roughly speaking, as
the number of bidders increase, not only are sellers able (in some equilibria) to transmit
more information in terms of higher degree partitions, but it is in their interests to do so.
When setting reserve prices is allowed at the same time as disclosing product infor-
mation, we further show that full revealing equilibrium is sustainable in a message-price
informative equilibrium for HD products, as in the case of VD products. This is because
the seller can adjust the reserve prices such that all the interim expected revenues be
equal. However, in contrast to the case of VD products, for HD products, a full-revealing
message-price informative equilibrium can result in higher revenue level than null infor-
mation with optimal reserve price, as long as the number of bidders is su¢ ciently large.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a short discussion of
related literature. Section 3 sets up our model. Section 4 examines cheap-talk information
disclosure for VD products. Section 5 focuses on cheap-talk information disclosure for HD
products. Specically, Section 5.1 investigates the properties of the interim expected rev-
enue. Section 5.2 provides some interesting characterizations of message-only informative
equilibria. Section 5.3 proves an existence theorem for message-only informative equilib-
ria. Section 5.4 shows the complementarity property of the optimal disclosure policies.
Section 5.5 studies the message-price informative equilibria under cheap-talk. Section
6 re-investigates the information disclosure problem for HD products, yet under truthful
disclosure. Section 7 is a short conclusion.
2 Related Literature
This paper examines cheap talk information disclosure for HD and VD products taking as
given that the sale will take place a standard auction mechanism. In two interesting recent
contributions Balestrieri and Izmalkov (2016) and Koessler and Skreta (2016) consider
the design of more general mechanisms for selling goods in a HD context. Balestrieri and
Izmalkov (2016) derive the optimal selling mechanism for a monopolist who is privately
informed about the attributes of a horizontally di¤erentiated good. They show that a
rather rich class of mechanisms can obtain depending on the precise details of the model.
For instance, optimal mechanism may involve type-specic probabilistic allocations, which
can also be implemented through private transmission of di¤erent information to di¤erent
buyer types. Koessler and Skreta (2016) consider a single buyer whose willingness to pay
depends on his privately-known taste and on product characteristics privately known by
the seller. They explore general properties of the class of selling procedures that can arise
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as an equilibrium of the game in which the seller chooses mechanisms conditional on her
information. Such mechanisms include for instance bilateral cheap talk.
Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) consider informative multidimensional cheap talk
in which an expert can make credible comparative statements that trade o¤ her incentive
to exaggerate on each dimension. They give an example applied to product advertising
in which the product in question has elements of both horizontal and vertical di¤erenti-
ation. This multidimensional trade-o¤ theme which is developed further in Chakraborty
and Harbaugh (2014) has some similarities with the mechanism supporting cheap talk
equilibria in our model.
There is a strand of literature that studies information policies in various situations,
such as in monopoly pricing (Lewis and Sappington, 1994; Johnson and Myatt, 2006), and
in auctions (Board, 2009; Ganuza and Penalva, 2010; Hummel and McAfee, 2015). As in
MW (1982), they assume that a seller commits to a preset information policy. However,
rather than public disclosure of a signal, the information policy relates to the precision with
which buyers will learn their valuations. Relatedly, but closer to our approach, Ganuza
(2004) constructs an explicit HD model but in which buyer preferences are distributed on
a circle, rather than line. In that paper the seller chooses a public disclosure rule à la MW
(1982) (but from a restricted class of rules) rather than cheap talk. He shows that the
optimal amount of information disclosure increases with the number of bidders, under the
assumption that it is more costly to reveal more precise information. This complementary
result is related to but di¤erent to the one reported in this paper. Both occur because of
competition tending to eliminate the negative consequences of releasing information.
3 A Symmetric Model
An auctioneer sells a single nondivisible product to n bidders, indexed by i 2 f1; 2;    ; ng.
Bidder is valuation of the product depends on his own taste ~i as well as the product
attribute ~s. Both ~i and ~s are real-valued random variables, with i and s as their typical
realizations respectively. Bidder is valuation of the product is
vi = u (s; i; i) ; (1)
where  i is a vector of the tastes of all other bidders, and u is symmetric in  i, as in
the general symmetric model of MW (1982). We normalize the sellers valuation of the
product to 0, and she is a revenue maximizer.
The distribution function of ~s is G (s), with strictly positive density g (s). Bidders
tastes, ~is, are independent draws from the same distribution of F (), with strictly posi-
tive density f (), and ~s and ~is are also independent from each other. The distributions
of G (s) and F () are common knowledge, but the realized product attribute s and bidder
is taste i, are respectively the seller and bidder is private information.
Prior to the auction, the seller has the option of revealing product information to the
bidders, by sending a public cheap-talk message. We focus on information structure in the
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form of partitions, as common in the literature on cheap-talk. Specically, the disclosure
strategy is a mapping from the attribute space S to the message space M , denoted by
 : S ! M , and for each message m,  1 (m) is a (connected) subinterval on S. We
suppose M is rich enough such that  can be an unto function. For a given message m,
the conditional distribution of ~s is denoted by G (sjm) with the corresponding density
g (s jm) =  (m js) g (s)R
x2S  (m jx) dG (x)
; (2)
and bidder is posterior expected valuation of the product, denoted by v (i;m), is thus
v (i;m) =
Z
s2S
E [u(i; i; s)] g (s jm) ds; (3)
based on which he submits his bids b (i;m). We denote the vector of n biddersbidding
strategies as b (m) = (b (1;m) ;    ; b (n;m)), and bidder is optimal bidding strategy
as b (i;m) that maximizes his expected payo¤ in the auction. Conditional on s and
the public message m, the bidders submit their bids, and we dene the expected auction
revenue as interim expected auction revenue, denoted by R (m; s).
The timing of the game is as follow: rst, Nature selects the realizations of product
attribute ~s and the bidders tastes, ~is, which are privately observed by the seller and
corresponding bidders respectively; second, based on her observation of s, the seller sends
a public message m (and set a reserve price r (s), if setting reserve prices is allowed); third,
bidders update their beliefs and o¤er bids in a standard auction; nally, the auction and
the nal payo¤s are implemented.
The equilibrium concept applied here is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE): i) bidders
belief follows Bayesian rule of (2), when it is applicable; ii) given the beliefs, bidders
bidding strategies are optimal; iii) the sellers disclosure strategy is also optimal. When
reserve prices are not considered, the sellers strategy is to set the disclosure policy, and
we dene the message-only equilibrium, denoted as m-PBE, as follows.
Denition 1 A m-PBE consists of a strategy prole (;b) and belief system g (s jm)
such that: i) g (s jm) is derived from Bayesian rule of (2) when applicable; ii) bidders
o¤er their optimal bids given their beliefs, that is, b (i;m) = b (i;m) for all i; iii) the
seller chooses optimal signalling strategy such that
R ( (s) ; s)  R    s0 ; s ; for 8s; s0 2 S: (4)
Under cheap-talk, the seller can send any possible message she likes. The incentive
compatible condition of (4) implies that, in equilibrium, the seller will prefer truthful infor-
mation disclosure rather than deviation. Therefore, them-PBE constitutes an informative
equilibrium where the revealed information is credible and informative.
Auction, as a selling mechanism, may involve the selection of reserve prices, which is
similar to posted prices in the context of monopoly pricing. When reserve prices are con-
sidered, the sellers strategy becomes twofold: besides the signalling strategy of  (s), she
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also needs to set the reserve price r (s) conditional on the realization of product attribute.
With reserve prices, the interim expected auction revenue is denoted by R ( (s) ; r (s) ; s).
Similarly, we dene the message-price equilibrium, denoted by (m; r)-PBE, as follows.
Denition 2 A (m; r)-PBE consists of a strategy prole (; r;b) and belief system g (s jm; r )
such that: i) g (s jm; r ) is derived from Bayesian rule of (2) when applicable; ii) bidders
o¤er their optimal bids given their beliefs, that is, b (i;m; r) = b (i;m; r) for all i; iii)
the seller chooses optimal signalling strategy such that
R ( (s) ; r (s) ; s)  R    s0 ; r  s0 ; s ; for 8s; s0 2 S:
The above denitions correspond to the PBEs under cheap-talk, where the interim
incentive conditions, e.g. (4), must be satised in equilibria. If the seller is committed
to truthful information disclosure, we can similarly dene the corresponding m-PBE and
(m; r)-PBE, by simply removing the incentive compatible condition of (4).
With this symmetric model, our interests lie in the characterization of relevant infor-
mative equilibria, and the optimal strategies of cheap talk disclosure in auctions. Here we
focus on standard auctions, where the bidder o¤ering the highest bids wins, such as rst-,
second-price and English auctions. And, as mentioned before, we will investigate both
vertically and horizontally di¤erentiated products, where the former is closely related to
MW (1982), and the latter is more of our interests in this paper.
4 Vertically Di¤erentiated (VD) Products
In the general symmetric model of MW (1982), the valuation function of u (s; i; i) is
assumed to be increasing in both s and (i; i). This corresponds exactly to the case of
VD products. We may think of s in this case as the vertical quality of the product, and
all bidders prefer high quality to low quality product, when other things are equal. We
keep the same assumption of MW (1982) here for this Section.
Assumption 1 (A1) u (s; i; i) is non-decreasing in both (i; i) and s.
Specically, when we mention VD products, we mean assumption A1 is true. Under
Assumption 1 and that the seller is committed to truthful disclosure, MW (1982) prove
the following well-known result on optimal disclosure.
Proposition 3 (MW, 1982) For VD products and under truthful disclosure, in standard
auctions without reserve prices, revealing full information ( (s) = s) maximizes expected
auction revenue.
Compared with MW (1982), here in our symmetric model, we impose a weak version
of positive a¢ liation between ~s and ~is, by assuming that they are all independent from
each other. MW (1982) further consider the e¤ects of introducing reserve prices, and show
that the introduction of reserve price, r (s), may raise the expected auction revenues.
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Proposition 4 (MW, 1982) For VD products and under truthful disclosure, in standard
auctions with given reserve prices, revealing full information maximizes expected revenue.
For any other disclosure policy, there is a ( (s) ; r (s)) policy with  (s) = s which yields
higher ex-ante expected revenue.
We now turn to the case of cheap-talk information disclosure, and focus on information
structure in the form of partitions. For the VD products in our symmetric model, as
implied in assumption A1, we show that a partition m-PBE does not exist. The basic
intuition is that, for VD products, the seller always has incentive to announce that the
product is of high quality, regardless of what the real product quality is. As a result, the
revealed information can not be credible in equilibrium.
Proposition 5 For VD products and under cheap-talk disclosure, in standard auctions
without reserve prices, there does not exist a m-PBE in the form of partitions.
Proof. Suppose there is a partition m-PBE with a nite number of messages,  (s) 2
fm1;m2;    ;mKg. Then for a message mj ,  1 (mj) is a (connected) subinterval on
the attribute space of S  R. And we can order two messages mj < mj0 , in such a
way that for any s 2  1 (mj) and s0 2  1
 
mj0

, s < s0. Under assumption A1,
biddersvaluations u is non-decreasing in s, therefore for two messages mj < mj0 , both
R
 
mj0 ; s
0 > R (mj ; s0) and R  mj0 ; s > R (mj ; s), which violates the incentive compatible
condition of (4). Hence mj and mj0 can not both be messages in a partition m-PBE.
Proposition 6 For VD products and under cheap-talk disclosure, in standard auctions
with reserve prices: (1) there exists a full revealing (m; r)-PBE; (2) but the expected auction
revenue in the full revealing (m; r)-PBE is lower than that in a babbling equilibrium with
optimal reserve price.
Proof. Under assumption A1, let s be the worse product attribute (quality), and r be
the corresponding optimal reserve for it. (1) For any s 2 S and s > s, choose the reserve
price r (s) such that R (s; r (s) ; s) = R (s; r; s), which is always possible by continuity,
since R (s; r (s) ; s) > R (s; r; s), where r (s) is the optimal reserve when s is revealed,
and limr!1R (s; r; s) = 0. (2) The expected revenue under full revealing is R (s; r; s),
which is smaller than R (?; r?) by MW (1982), where ? means revealing no information
and r? is the optimal reserve in this case.
Gardete (2013) proposes a model of informative cheap-talk advertising for vertically
di¤erentiated products, and his key assumption is that di¤erent types of consumers have
access to di¤erent outside options, which plays a similar role of setting di¤erent reserve
prices here in our symmetric model.
5 Horizontally Di¤erentiated (HD) Products
For HD products, the valuation u (s; i; i) is non-monotonic in s, and bidders of di¤erent
tastes prefer di¤erent product attribute s. A standard setting for product horizontal
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di¤erentiation is that, a bidders valuation of the product depends on the match between
his own taste i and the product attribute s. Therefore, u is single-peaked and may have
the single-crossing property in (s; i). And we adopt the leading example of quadratic
valuation that possesses the above properties,
u (s; i) = V    (s  i)2 ; (5)
where V is a commonly know vertical value of the product, and  is a parameter measuring
the degree of disutility of mismatch. Without loss of generality, we assume both ~s and is
are dened on the attribute space of S = [ 1; 1], and we introduce the following symmetry
assumption on their distributions.
Assumption 2 (A2) Both g (s) and f () are log-concave and symmetric to 0.
Many distributions are log-concave, such as normal, uniform distribution and so on.
The log-concavity assumption implies that the density functions of f and g are unimodal.
And with the symmetry assumption, f and g have the common mean and mode of 0.
Without specication, assumption A2 always holds in our analysis in Section 5 and 6.
As for the disclosure policy, we dene a J-partition of the attribute interval S by a
sequence of cutting point, PJ = (s0; s1; s2;    ; sJ), such that  1 = s0 < s1 <    < sJ 1 <
sJ = 1, and J 2 Z+ is dened as the degree of partition. Thus a J-partition divides S
into J subintervals. Denote PJ the space of all J-partitions, and PJ is apparently a
convex set, as the convex combination of any two J-partitions is still a J-partition. Let
j = jsj   sj 1j be the length of the subinterval [sj 1; sj ], and we dene an equal partition
as a partition where all the subintervals are of equal length, denoted by P J .
Under a partition of PJ , the message spaceM is composed of J distinct messages, and
the disclosure policy is denoted by J , which is
J (s) = mj i¤ s 2 [sj 1; sj) , 0  j < J; (6)
and for j = J , J (s) = mJ i¤ s 2 [sJ 1; sJ ]. Given a message mj in partition PJ , the
conditional mean and variance of ~s are denoted respectively by
j = E (~s jmj ) ; 2j = Var (~s jmj ) : (7)
We dene signal precision intuitively based on the conditional variance of 2j . Formally,
for two messages mj and mj0 in partition PJ , mj is said to be more precise than mj0 i¤
2j < 
2
j0 . In particular, when G follows a uniform distribution, 
2
j = 
2
j=12, and mj is
more precise than mj0 i¤j < j0 .
Under the symmetry assumption of f and g, we focus on partitions that are symmetric
to 0, and assume j  0 without loss of generality. For a partition PJ symmetric to
0, it can be equivalently represented by its positive cutting points, and there are two
possibilities: when J = 2K, K 2 Z+, then PJ = ( sK ; ;    ; s1; 0; s1;    ; sK), where
sK = 1 and we dene 1 = js1j; when J = 2K 1, then PJ = ( sK ;    ; s1; s1;    ; sK),
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and we dene 1 = j2s1j; in both cases, for j = 2;    ;K, j = jsj   sj 1j, as dened
before. Then a partition of PJ that is symmetric to 0 can be equivalently represented by
the sequence of positive cutting points, PJ = (s1; s2;    ; sK).
5.1 Interim Expected Auction Revenue: an Analysis
We rst provide some characterizations of the interim expected revenue R (m; s), where
reserve prices are not considered. For horizontally di¤erentiated products, a bidders valu-
ation of the product is given by (5). Given our assumption that ~s and ~is are independent
from each other, when a message m is announced, biddersposterior valuations are actu-
ally independent draws from the same distribution. And the auction is in fact a standard
independent private value auction, where the bidder with the highest bid wins, and the
revenue is equal to the second highest valuation of the bidders. Therefore, R (m; s) is
equal to the expected value of the second highest v (i;m)s. It will be shown later that
R (m; s) does not explicitly depend on s, and we then simplify the notation as R (m).
A simple calculation from (3) and (5) shows that bidder is posterior valuation
v (i;mj) = V   
h
Var (~s jmj ) + (i   E (~s jmj ))2
i
= V   
h
2j +
 
i   j
2i
: (8)
It is interesting to nd that revealing product attribute information, mj , has two di¤erent
e¤ects on biddersposterior valuations. One is the universal e¤ect of risk reduction, that
is, providing more precise signal (smaller 2j ) reduces the risk or mismatch for all of the
bidders, and thus raises their valuations ceteris paribus. The other is the idiosyncratic
e¤ect of attribute revelation, that is, by sharpening the conditional expectation of the
product attribute (j), it not only drives up the valuations of some bidders whose tastes
closely match j , but drives down those of other bidders who nd they are poorly matched.
To spare notation, we introduce a new random variable ~i (s), which measures the
distance between a bidders taste and the product attribute, as follows,
~i (s) =

~i   s
2
: (9)
We denote the distribution function of ~i (s) by H(; s), with the corresponding density
h(; s). Our rst result is to show that, H(; s), as a family of distributions indexed by s,
can be ordered by dispersive order and rst order stochastic dominance. We rst provide
the relevant denitions of the stochastic orders.
Denition 7 Given two random variables ~i (s0) and ~i (s00) with distribution functions
H(; s0) and H(; s00) respectively, we say that
1) ~i (s
0) is smaller than ~i (s00) in the dispersive order, denoted by ~i (s0) disp ~i (s00),
if H 1(q; s0) H 1(p; s0)  H 1(q; s00) H 1(p; s00) for all 0 < p < q < 1.
2) ~i (s
0) is smaller than ~i (s00) in the rst order stochastic dominance, denoted by
~i (s
0) FOSD ~i (s00), if H(x; s0)  H(x; s00) for all x 2 R.
Dispersive order is a stochastic order that helps to compare the variability of two
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random variables, and ~i (s
0) disp ~i (s00) implies that the variance of ~i (s0) is smaller
than that of ~i (s
00). Compared with the direct comparison of variances of two random
variables, dispersive order provides more information on the underlying distributions. And
the rst order stochastic dominance is more related to the comparisons of the expectation
of two random variables, and ~i (s
0) FOSD ~i (s00) implies that E~i (s0)  E~i (s00). Based
on our symmetry assumption of A2 on F (), we have the following result.
Lemma 8 For 0  s0 < s00  1,
i) ~i (s
0) disp ~i (s00);
ii) ~i (s
0) FOSD ~i (s00).
Proof. From (9), it is clear that
H (x; s) = F
 
s+
p
x
  F  s px ; x 2 0;  (s) ; (10)
where  (s) = (1 + s)2. i) From result (3.B.11) of Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007), to
prove ~i (s
0) disp ~i (s00), it is equivalent to show that h
 
H 1 (p; s) ; s

is monotonically
decreasing in s for all p 2 (0; 1). Di¤erentiating with respect to s,
@h
@s
=
@h
@x
@H 1
@s
+
@h
@s
=  hx
 
H 1 (p; s) ; s
 Hs  H 1 (p; s) ; s
h (H 1 (p; s) ; s)
+ hs
 
H 1 (p; s) ; s

:
By substituting H (x; s) in (10) and H 1 (p; s) = x, we get
@h
@s
=   f 0  s+px  f 0  s px f (s+px)  f (s px)
f (s+
p
x) + f (s px)+

f 0
 
s+
p
x

+ f 0
 
s px :
The condition for @h@s  0 appears to be equivalent to
f 0 (s+
p
x)
f (s+
p
x)
+
f 0 (s px)
f (s px)  0:
The symmetry assumption of A2 implies that
f 0(
p
x)
f(
p
x)
+
f 0( px)
f( px) = 0. So the above condition
nally becomes
f 0 (
p
x+ s)
f (
p
x+ s)
  f
0 (
p
x  s)
f (
p
x  s)  0;
which is true given A2 that f () is log-concave and s  0.
ii) It is clear that H (x; s) is decreasing in s under A2 and s  0, and then ~i (s0) is
rst-order stochastically dominated by ~i (s
00).
Dispersive order and FOSD measure the variabilities and expectations of two random
variables respectively. It then follows from Lemma 8 that, with increasing s, ~i (s)
becomes more and more dispersed with both increasing variance and increasing mean.
We next derive the expression of the interim expected auction revenue, R (mj). For
a given public message mj , ~i
 
j

s are n independent draws from the same distribution
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of H
 ;j. The corresponding order statistics of ~is are
~1:n  ~2:n      ~n:n;
where ~k:n is the kth smallest order statistic of the n random variables of ~is.
Apparently, ~1:n corresponds to the bidder whose taste is the closest to j , and he also
has the highest posterior valuation of the product. In a standard auction, the bidder with
~1:n wins, and his expected payment is equal to the expected valuation of the bidder with
~2:n. From (8), the interim expected auction revenue is thus
R (mj) = V   
h
2j + E~2:n
 
j
i
: (11)
Then conditional on a public message mj , the interim expected auction revenue, R (mj),
is jointly determined by signal precision, 2j , and the expected value of ~2:n
 
j

. To
characterize R (mj), we rst prove some interesting properties of E~2:n (s), which are
related to the results of Lemma 8. The result below shows that E~2:n (s) is decreasing in
n, and both increasing and convex in s.
Lemma 9 For s 2 [0; 1],
i) E~2:n (s) is strictly decreasing in n, and limn!1 E~2:n (s) = 0 uniformly;
ii) E~2:n (s) is strictly increasing in s;
iii) E~2:n (s) is strictly convex in s.
Proof. We denote the distribution function of ~2:n (s) by H2:n(; s), and the corresponding
density function by h2:n(; s). It is easy to show that
H2:n(x; s) = 1  [1 H (x; s)]n   n [1 H (x; s)]n 1H (x; s) : (12)
i) For x 2  0;  (s), H2:n(x) H2:n+1(x) =  nH (x)2 [1 H (x)]n 1 < 0, and thus
E
h
~2:n+1 (s)  ~2:n (s)
i
=
Z (s)
0
[H2:n(x) H2:n+1(x)] dx < 0:
Moreover, for any s 2 [0; 1], it is clear that
lim
n!1E
~2:n (s) =
 (s) 
Z (s)
0
lim
n!1H2:n(x; s)dx = 0
pointwisely. Dinis Theorem implies that E~2:n (s) uniformly converges to 0 on s 2 [0; 1].
ii) For the distribution function of H2:n(x; s), di¤erentiating with respect to s, we get
@H2:n(x;s)
@s = n (n  1) [1 H (x)]n 2H (x) @H(x;s)@s < 0 for all x 2
 
0;  (s)

, as @H(x)@s < 0
from Lemma 8. Therefore, with increasing s, the family of H2:n(x; s) is ordered by rst-
order stochastic dominance, and E~2:n (s) is strictly increasing in s.
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iii) We have @E
~2:n
@s =  
R (s)
0
@H2:n(x;s)
@s dx > 0, where
@H2:n
@s
= n (n  1) (1 H)n 2H@H
@s
=
@H2:n
@x
@H=@s
@H=@x
:
Let  (x; s) =   @H=@s@H=@x , which is strictly positive. Therefore,
@E~2:n
@s
=
Z (s)
0
 (x; s) dH2:n(x; s):
To prove E~2:n (s) is convex in s, it is equivalent to prove
@E~2:n
@s is increasing in s. Given
H2:n(x; s) is decreasing in s, it is su¢ cient to show  (x; s) is increasing in s. We have
1
2
p
x
 (x; s) =
f (s+
p
x)  f (s px)
f (s+
p
x) + f (s px) =
f(s+
p
x)
f(s px)   1
f(s+
p
x)
f(s px) + 1
=
f(
p
x+s)
f(
p
x s)   1
f(
p
x+s)
f(
p
x s) + 1
:
Since y 1y+1 is increasing,  (x; s) is increasing in s if
f(
p
x+s)
f(
p
x s) is decreasing in s. This is
true as f is log-concave by A2.
The intuition for i) of Lemma 9 is straightforward: with increasing n, there are more
and more bidders in the auction, and it then becomes more likely that bidderstastes are
on average closer to a given attribute s. Second, ii) and iii) of Lemma 9 show that, when
s moves from the centre of 0 to the extreme of 1, E~2:n (s) is increasing at an accelerating
rate. This is because, under assumption A2, when s increases from 0 to 1, the value of
f () gets smaller and smaller, implying that fewer bidders favor the product attribute,
and therefore the average distance between  and s gets larger. Figure 1 below provides
a numerical example, where f () follows a uniform distribution, that helps illustrate the
properties of E~2:n (s). The example shows that E~2:n (s) converges to 0 when n increases,
and for given n, E~2:n (s) is increasing and convex in s.
Figure 1. Properties of E~2:n (s)
The next result shows that, for two di¤erent product attributes, the increment in
E~2:n (s) is also decreasing in n, and moreover, that increment converges to 0 uniformly
when n converges to innity.
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Lemma 10 For 0  s0 < s00  1,
i) E
h
~2:n (s
00)  ~2:n (s0)
i
is decreasing in n;
ii) limn!1 E
h
~2:n (s
00)  ~2:n (s0)
i
= 0 uniformly.
Proof. For 0  s0 < s00  1, (i) we know ~i (s00) disp ~i (s0), and therefore
X =
h
V    ~i
 
s00
i disp hV    ~i  s0i = Y;
by the property of dispersive order. From Theorem 6 of Ganuza and Penalva (2010), we
have E [X2:n   Y2:n]  E [X2:n 1   Y2:n 1], which is equivalent to
E
h
~2:n
 
s00
  ~2:n  s0i  E h~2:n 1  s00  ~2:n 1  s0i :
(ii) As limn!1 E~2:n (s) = 0 uniformly on s 2 [0; 1] from Lemma 9, then for any 0 
s0 < s00  1, limn!1 E
h
~2:n (s
00)  ~2:n (s0)
i
= 0 pointwisely. From Dinis Theorem, we
have limn!1 E
h
~2:n (s
00)  ~2:n (s0)
i
= 0 uniformly.
It is worth attention that the results in Lemma 8, 9 and 10 do not depend on the
specic format of a disclosure rule, e.g. whether it is partition or not. What really
matters is the assumption that the distribution of bidderstastes, F , is log-concave and
symmetric to 0. We will repeatedly apply these results in our following discussion of the
informative equilibria and the proof of equilibrium existence.
5.2 Informative Equilibria: Characterizations
If a m-PBE exists, then the sellers incentive compatible condition of (4) at the interim
stage must be satised. As R (m; s) does not explicitly depend on s, as shown in (11), it
then follows from (4) that, in equilibrium
R (mj) = R
 
mj0

; for 8s; s0 2 S: (13)
This condition implies that, in a m-PBE, all the interim expected revenues are equal.
Given our symmetric setting, we just focus on partitions symmetric to 0, which can be
equivalently represented by a sequence of positive cutting points. We denote the optimal
partition by P J = (s

1; s

2;    ; sK). For a given message mj , j and 2j denote the condi-
tional mean and variance of the product attribute respectively. The following equilibrium
property is a direct implication of the equal revenue condition of (13).
Proposition 11 For HD products and under cheap-talk, if there exists a m-PBE partition
P J , then for any two distinct messages mj and mj0 such that j < j0, we have
2
j
> 2j0 ; (14)
which is equivalent to j > j0 if G (s) is uniform distribution.
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Proof. From (11), the interim expected auction revenue is R (mj) is decreasing in both
2j and j , as E~2:n (s) is strictly increasing in s. For two distinct messages mj and
mj0 , if j < j0 , then it is necessary that 
2
j
> 2j0 in equilibrium, otherwise the equal
revenue condition of (13) can not be satised. Second, the result for uniform distribution
is obvious as 2
j
= 2j=12 when G is uniform.
Proposition 11 states that, in a m-PBE , when the expected product attribute moves
from the centre towards the extremes, it is necessary to provide more precise signals for
those attributes. The intuition is as follows. Given the assumption that the distribution of
bidderstastes is unimodal and symmetric to 0, it is clear that when the product attribute
moves from 0 to the extreme of 1, the product becomes less and less popular. For the
less popular products, the interim expected revenue is lower ceteris paribus. However, in
a m-PBE, it is necessary that all the R (mj)s be equal, otherwise the seller will deviate
from truthful revealing. For example, she will just report the message that generates the
highest interim expected revenue, regardless of the real product attribute, which makes
the revealed information not credible. As a result, it is necessary to provide more precise
signals for the less popular product attributes in equilibrium, so as to compensate that
revenue decit.
We could provide a formal denition on the popularity of a product attribute, as
follows: a product attribute s is more popular than s0, if at any positive price, the demand
for s is greater than that for s0. Given our assumption of symmetric distribution of F ()
in A2, it is evident that, when the product attribute moves from the centre of 0 to the
extremes of 1, it becomes less and less popular. We then have the following corollary.
Corollary 12 For HD products and under cheap-talk, in a m-PBE, the seller provides
more precise information for less popular product attributes.
Another implication of Proposition 11 is that full information disclosure is not possible
under cheap-talk, when the number of bidders is given. Full information disclosure implies
that the seller reports the true value of s to the bidders, and thus  (s) = s and 2j = 0
always. However, as E~2:n (s) is strictly increasing in s, the equal revenue condition of
(13) can never be satised in equilibrium, in this case.
Corollary 13 For HD products and under cheap-talk, full information disclosure can not
happen in a m-PBE, when n is given.
This result is distinct from the full disclosure result in the literature (Ganuza, 2004;
Board, 2009; Ganuza and Penalva, 2010; Hummel and McAfee, 2015), where the seller
is committed to truthful disclosure. We next show that, when n converges to innity,
then the m-PBE partition will converge to a partition where all the signals are of the
same precision level. This is because, with increasing n, the di¤erence in E~2:n (s) across
di¤erent product attributes converges uniformly to 0 (Lemma 10), and therefore the equal
revenue condition of (13) necessarily implies that the seller needs to provide equal precise
signals for all the product attributes in equilibrium.
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Corollary 14 For HD products and under cheap-talk, in a m-PBE partition P J , for any
two signals mj and mj0, we have
lim
n!1
 
2j   2j0

= 0 for 8j; j0:
Moreover, if G is uniform distribution, then limn!1 P J = P J .
Proof. The equal revenue condition of (13) implies that
0 = lim
n!1
h
2j + E~2:n
 
j
  2j0 + E~2:n  j0i
= lim
n!1
 
2j   2j0

+ lim
n!1E
h
~2:n
 
j
  ~2:n  j0i
= lim
n!1
 
2j   2j0

[from Lemma 10 (ii)]
Second, when G is uniform, then limn!1

2j   2j0

= 112 limn!1

2j  2j0

= 0, which
implies that limn!1 P J = P J .
Below we provide a numerical example, where both F () and G (s) follow a uniform
distribution on S, that helps to illustrate the properties of the m-PBEs. And the example
shows that, in an equilibrium partition, more precise information is provided for less
popular product attributes, and that, with increasing number of bidders, the equilibrium
partition P J converges to the equal partition of P J .
Example 15 We provide an numerical example where both F () and G (s) follow a uni-
form distribution on S = [ 1; 1]. We restrict out attention to partitions of degree 3, and
denote the partition as P3 = ( 1; s1; s1; 1). And an equal partition corresponds to the
cutting point of s1 = 13 , apparently.
Figure 2. Properties of Informative Equilibria: an Example
First, Proposition 11 implies that, for given n, in an equilibrium partitions of P 3 , it is
necessary that s1 >
1
3 . Second, Corollary 14 implies that, when n!1, P 3 will converge
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to equal partition, that is limn!1 s1 =
1
3 .
We select V = 10 and  = 1. In Figure 2, the solid lines shows how the interim
expected revenue R (m1) changes with s1 for di¤erent ns. Similarly, the dashed lines
shows that of R (m2). For a given n, the crossing point of R (m1) and R (m2) represents
a m-PBE partition, where the equal revenue condition of (13) is satised. Figure 2 shows
that for n = 6; 8 and 20, the crossing points s1 are all to the right of
1
3 , which conrms
the results of Proposition 11. Second, when n increases, the crossing point moves up-left,
and becomes more and more close to the equal partition point of s1 = 13 , which conrms
the convergence result of Corollary 14.
5.3 Informative Equilibria: an Existence Theorem
We have provided some characterizations of them-PBEs, yet havent shown such equilibria
do exist. In this section, we provide an existence theorem, which shows that, for any given
partition degree J 2 Z+, there always exists am-PBE in the form of partitions, P J , as long
as the number of bidders is su¢ ciently large. In the proof, we apply the Intermediate Value
Theorem (IVT) dened on partial order sets (Guilerme, 1995), and the main objective of
the proof is to show that, under certain conditions, there exists a partition such that all
the interim expected revenues are equal.
The interim expected revenue, as in (11), is determined by both E~2:n
 
j

and 2j .
Specically, the conditional variance of 2j is related to the underlying distribution of
G (s jmj ). When G (s) is a uniform distribution, there is a simple expression of the con-
ditional variance, 2j =
1
12
2
j , which is solely determined by the length of the subinterval.
To make the basic intuition more clear, while at the same time avoid unnecessary compli-
cations, we make the following simplication assumption on G (s). Without specication,
we assume the following assumption of A3 is true for the parts of Section 5 and 6.
Assumption 3 (A3) G (s) is uniform distribution on S.
The proof of the existence of m-PBEs is composed of four steps: 1) to dene a metric
space of partitions, (PJ ; d), and the partial order on it, and to show that it is convex
and thus connected; 2) to dene a continuous vector valued function f : PJ  ! RK 1,
with its jth element fj (PJ) = 1 [R (mj) R (mj 1)], j = 2;    ;K, which is the revenue
di¤erence of two neighboring subintervals; 3) to construct two particular partitions, P J
and PJ , such that P J < PJ , and show that for n being large enough, f (P J) < 0 < f
 
PJ

;
4) nally, applying the IVT, we then can prove that, if n is su¢ ciently large, there exists
a partition P J , such that P J < P

J <
PJ and f (P J ) = 0.
The IVT approach is somehow di¤erent from the standard approach of using xed
point theorems to prove equilibrium existence. As to be shown later, compared with
xed point theorems, the condition for applying the IVT is more restrictive, in the sense
that it imposes more restrictions on the monotonicity of functions. However, the result
is also more informative, as, di¤erent from xed point theorems, it indicates the relative
location of the equilibrium. And the proof is proceeded as follows.
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First, a partition PJ symmetric to 0 can be equivalently presented by a sequence of K
positive cutting points, that is, PJ = (s1; s2;    ; sK) where sj > 0 and sK = 1. For the
partition space PJ , we dene a metric d (; ) in the usual way that, for any PJ ; P 0J 2 PJ ,
d (PJ ; P
0
J) =
rPK
j=1

sj   s0j
2
, and we then dene the metric space of (PJ ; d). Next,
we introduce a partial order, , on PJ that, for any PJ ; P 0J 2 PJ , PJ  P 0J i¤ sj  s0j for
all j = 1;    ;K, and we then dene the partial order set of (PJ ;). Apparently, the
partition space PJ is convex, as any convex combination of two partitions PJ ; P 0J 2 PJ is
also a partition in PJ . Convexity implies that PJ is connected.
Second, we dene a vector-valued function f : PJ  ! RK 1, with its jth element
fj (PJ) =
 
2j   2j+1
  hE~2:n  j+1  E~2:n  ji ; j = 1; 2;    ;K   1: (15)
In fact, fj (PJ) = 1 [R (mj+1) R (mj)], which is the di¤erence in interim expected auc-
tion revenues of two neighboring subintervals. And f (PJ) = 0 implies that all the interim
expected revenues are equal.
Third, we construct two particular partitions, denoted by P J = (s1; s2;    ; sK) and
PJ = (s1; s2;    ; sK), such that P J < PJ and when n is su¢ ciently large, f (P J) < 0 <
f
 
PJ

. In fact, P J is just the equal partition, where all the subintervals are of the same
length. In an equal partition of P J , under assumption A3, we have 
2
j = 
2
j0 for any j; j
0,
which implies that fj (P J) = E
h
~2:n
 
j
  ~2:n  j+1i < 0 for all j = 1; 2;    ;K   1,
as E~2:n (s) is strictly increasing in s from Lemma 9. We then have, for any given n
f (P J) < 0: (16)
Furthermore, the partition of PJ = (s1; s2;    ; sK) is constructed in such a way that
j = j+1 +  (J) for j = 1;    ;K   1 and K 2 (0; 2=J) ; (17)
where j = jsj   sj 1j and  (J) is a strictly positive term, which is fully determined by
K . We next show that, by construction, P J < PJ .
Lemma 16 For P J and PJ , we have
i) P J < PJ ;
ii) for any PJ = (s1; s2;    ; sK) such that P J  PJ  PJ ,
(sj+1   sj)  K for all j = 1; 2;    ;K   1: (18)
Proof. For the equal partition P J = (s1; s2;    ; sK), it follows that
sj = 1  (K   j)
2
J
; j = 1; 2;    ;K;
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where J = 2K or 2K   1. And for PJ = (s1; s2;    ; sK), it is easy to show that
sj = 1  (K   j)

K +
1
2
(K   j   1)  (J)

; j = 1; 2;    ;K;
where
 (J) =
8<:
4
(J 1)2
 
2  J K

if J = 2K   1
4
(J 1)2 1
 
2  J K

if J = 2K
:
For PJ to be non-trivial, its needed that K  2. We rst show that for all j < K, we
always have sj < sj : i) when J = 2K, it follows that sj sj = (K   j)
 
1
K  K
 j
K 1 > 0;
ii) when J = 2K   1, similarly, we have sj   sj =
 
2
J  K
 (K j)
2(K 1)

2K 1
K 1 j   1

> 0.
Then we show that, by construction, P J < PJ .
Second, for any partition PJ = (s1; s2;    ; sK) satisfying P J  PJ  PJ , we have
sj+1   sj  sj+1   sj =  (j), which is shown to be bounded below by K : i) when
J = 2K,
 (j) =
1
K
   sj   sj = 1K   (K   j)

1
K
  K

j
K   1 ;
which is strictly increasing in j, so minj  (j;K) = s2   s1 = K ; ii) when J = 2K   1,
 (j) =
2
J
   sj   sj+1 = 2J  

2
J
 K

(K   j)
2 (K   1)

2K   1
K   1 j   1

;
which is again strictly increasing in j, so minj  (j) = s2   s1  K .
At this stage, we have shown that f (P J) < 0 for any given n, and that P J < PJ by
construction. Next we will show that, when n is su¢ ciently large, f
 
PJ

> 0.
Lemma 17 There exists an NJ 2 Z+ such that for any n  NJ , f
 
PJ

> 0.
Proof. From (17), the partition of PJ is fully determined by K . And it is easy to show
that, in partition PJ ,
min
j
 
2j   2j+1

= 2K 1   2K =  (J)

2 K +  (J)

= 
 
K

> 0:
As E~2:n (s) uniformly converges to 0 (Lemma 7), there exists a NJ 2 Z+ such that for
any n  NJ , 0 < E~2:n (s) < 112
 
K

for all s 2 [0; 1]. Therefore, for n  NJ , and
8j = 1; 2;    ;K   1;
fj
 
PJ

=
 
2j   2j+1
  hE~2:n  j+1  E~2:n  ji > 112   K  112   K = 0;
and hence, f
 
PJ ;n

> 0.
So far we have shown that, for the two particular partitions P J and PJ , by construction
P J < PJ , and when n is large enough, f (P J) < 0 < f
 
PJ

. To prove the existence of
an m-PBE, we next show that, when n is su¢ ciently large, there exists an equilibrium
partition, denoted by P J , such that P J < P

J <
PJ and f (P J ) = 0. Here we apply the
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IVT for semi-continuous functions dened on partial order sets (Guillerme,1995). The
theorem is quoted as below
Theorem 18 (IVT, Guillerme, 1995) Let h := (hi)i2I be a function from an interval
of [u;v] in RI with u  v. Suppose that, for each i in I and each x in [u;v], the following
properties are fullled:
(1) the function hi (; x i) is upper semi-continuous on the right on [ui; vi];
(2) the function hi (; x i) is lower semi-continuous on the left on [ui; vi];
(3) the function hi (xi; ) is nonincreasing on [u i;v i].
Then the interval [h (u) ;h (v)] is contained in the set h ([u;v]).
Compared with the standard IVT theorem for real-valued function, the IVT theorem
for vector-valued functions not only requires the continuity of the function, but imposes
some monotonicity restrictions on its element functions. We will show that these condi-
tions are all naturally satised in our model, and we have the following existence theorem.
Theorem 19 (Existence Theorem) For any J 2 Z+, there exists a minimum number
of bidders, N (J), such that for any n  N (J), a m-PBE can be supported by a J-
partition.
Proof. As shown above, the set of J-partitions, PJ , is a convex hull in RK+ and therefore
connected. Next, for the dened vector-valued function f : PJ  ! RK 1, its jth element
fj (PJ) =
 
2j   2j+1
  hE~2:n  j+1  E~2:n  ji ; j = 1; 2;    ;K   1;
is continuous in PJ and thus conditions (1) and (2) of Guillerme (1995)s IVT Theorem
are satised. And by construction, we know P J < PJ and, for any n  NJ ,
f (P J) < 0 < f
 
PJ

:
We next show that, when n is su¢ ciently large, the monotonicity condition of (3) is
satised. First, @fj@sj+1 =  16j+1  12
@E~2:n(j)
@j
< 0 as E~2:n (s) is increasing in s. Second,
@fj
@sj 1
=  1
6
j +
1
2
@E~2:n
 
j

@j
;
where the rst term is negative and the second is positive. We already know from (18) in
Lemma 15, that, for any partition PJ 2

P J ; PJ

, j = sj sj 1  K > 0. Furthermore,
as E
h
~2:n
 
j+1
  ~2:n  ji uniformly converges to 0 (Lemma 10), then there exists an
N
 
K

such that for any n  N   K, @E~2:n(j)@j < 13 K , and thus @fj(PJ )@sj 1 < 0. Let
N (J) = max

NJ ; N
 
K
	
. Then for any n  N (J), conditions (1), (2) and (3) of the
IVT are all satised, and there exists an equilibrium partition P J 2

P J ; PJ

, such that
f (P J ) = 0:
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And a message-only informative equilibrium can be supported by a partition of P J .
Therefore, we can always nd an informative equilibrium for given partition degree J ,
as long as the number of bidders is su¢ ciently large. The intuition is that, with increasing
number of bidders, the di¤erences in popularity, measured by E~2:n (s), across di¤erent
product attributes converge to zero (Lemma 10), and it becomes easier for the seller to
adjust signal precision, measured by 2j , to get the equal revenue condition of (13) to be
satised. In the limit, when the number of bidders converges to innity, the di¤erences
in popularity across product attributes converge to 0, and the equilibrium partitions will
converge to partitions where all the signals are of the same level of precision. And the
following corollary shows that, with increasing n, the equilibrium partitions P J (n) will
get smaller and smaller, and gradually converge to the equal partition of P J .
Corollary 20 For given n, if a m-PBE J-partition exists, denote as P J (n), then for any
n0 > n, there also exists a m-PBE J-partition, denoted as ~P J (n
0). Moreover,
P J < ~P

J
 
n0

< P J (n) ;
and limn!1 P J (n) = P J .
Proof. Suppose in a n bidder auction, the J-partition of P J (n) = (s

1; s

2; s

3;    ; sK)
supports a m-PBE. Then we have, for any j = 1; 2;    ;K   1
fj (P

J (n)) =
 
2j   2j+1
  hE~2:n  j+1  E~2:n  ji = 0:
For n0 > n, in the same J-partition P J (n), we have
fj
 
P J
 
n0

=
 
2j   2j+1
  hE~2:n0  j+1  E~2:n0  ji
>
 
2j   2j+1
  hE~2:n  j+1  E~2:n  ji = 0;
because E~2:n
 
j+1
  E~2:n  j is strictly decreasing in n, from Lemma 4. Therefore,
f (P J ) > 0, and we still have f (P J) < 0. By applying the IVT on poset again, it follows
that there exists a J-partition ~P J (n
0) 2 [P J ; P J (n)] such that f

~P J (n
0)

= 0. The
convergence result of limn!1 P J (n) = P J is self-evident, given the property in Lemma
10 that limn!1
h
E~2:n
 
j+1
  E~2:n  ji = 0.
The corollary shows that, when the number of bidders increases, the equilibrium par-
tition ~P J (n) gets smaller and smaller, and gradually converges to the equal partition of
P J when n converges to innity. The intuition is straightforward. For an equilibrium
partition, we know from (13) that all the interim expected revenues are equal, which are
jointly determined by signal precision 2j and E~2:n
 
j

. With increasing n, the di¤er-
ences in E~2:n
 
j

s across di¤erent messages converge to 0 (Lemma 10), and therefore the
di¤erences in signal precision also need to decrease, such that the equal revenue condition
continues to be held in the new equilibrium ~P J (n
0). In consequence, with increasing n, the
equilibrium partitions become smaller and smaller and under assumption A3, converge to
the equal partition of P J .
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Another result is that, when the number of bidders is given, the maximum possible
degree for an m-PBE partition is bounded above. This result, as Corollary 13, also
implies that full information disclosure is not achievable in an m-PBE, when the number
of bidders is given. Formally, the result is as below.
Corollary 21 For given n, there exists a maximum degree for m-PBE partitions, denoted
as J (n). Furthermore, J (n) is nondecreasing in n.
Proof. The rst part is just the contrapositive of the existence theorem, and the second
part is implied by Corollary 20.
Corollary 21 shows that for given n, there exists an upper bound for the possible
degree of m-PBE partitions. On the other hand, the Existence Theorem above shows
that, for given J , there exists an equilibrium J-partition as long as the number of bidders
n is su¢ ciently large. Next, we will show that, for given n, if there exists an equilibrium
partition of degree J , then for any positive integral J 0 < J , there also exists an equilibrium
partition of degree J 0. The proof is similar as before, we rst show that for J 0 = J   1 or
J 2, there exists an equilibrium J 0-partition, and then the result is proved by mathematics
induction.
As before, we construct two particular partitions, P J 0 and PJ 0 , where P J 0 is an equal
partition of degree J 0. Let P J = (s

1; s

2;    ; sK) be an equilibrium partition when there
are n bidders, and PJ 0 is constructed as follows. First, for J 0 = J 2, PJ 2 is constructed
by removing the two cutting points of s1, and it is easy to show that P J 2 < PJ 2.
Second, for J 0 = J 1, there are two possible cases: i) if J = 2K, then PJ 1 is constructed
by removing the cutting point of s0 = 0; ii) if J = 2K   1, then PJ 1 is constructed by
removing the two cutting points of s1 and introducing a new cutting point of s0 = 0. It
is clear that P J 1 < PJ 1 in both cases.
Proposition 22 For given n, if there exists a m-PBE partition of degree J , then for any
J 0 < J , there also exist an equilibrium partition of degree J 0, denoted as P J 0. Furthermore,
P J 0 < P

J 0 <
PJ 0.
Proof. For J 0 < J , we dene the vector-valued function, f : PJ 0  ! RK0 1, with its jth
element being
fj (PJ 0) =
 
2j   2j+1
  hE~2:n  j+1  E~2:n  ji ;
for j = 1; 2;    ;K 0   1. We also denote the two particular partitions by P J 0 and PJ 0
respectively. As before, P J 0 is the equal partition of degree J
0, and it is clear that
f (P J 0) < 0. We will consider the cases of J
0 = J   2 and J 0 = J   2, and PJ 0 will be
constructed in the following way.
Let P J = (s

1; s

2; s

3;    ; sK) be the equilibrium J partition when there are n bidders,
and denote the corresponding conditional means and variances under mj by 2j and j
respectively. In the rst case of J 0 = J   2, PJ 2 is constructed by removing the cutting
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point of s1, and therefore PJ 2 = (s1; s2;    ; sK 1) = (s2; s3;    ; sK). It then follows
that
f1
 
PJ 2

=
 
21   22
  E h~2:n (2)  ~2:n (1)i
=
 
21   22
  E h~2:n (2)  ~2:n (1)i
>
 
21   22
  E h~2:n (2)  ~2:n (1)i = 0;
as 21 > 
2
1 and 1 > 1. And for other j > 1, fj
 
PJ 2

= 0 as P J is an equilibrium
partition. Therefore, f
 
PJ 0
  0.
In the second case of J 0 = J   1, if J = 2K, then the partition PJ 0 is constructed by
removing the cutting point of s0 = 0 in P J , and we then have
PJ 1 :  1 =  sK <    <  s1 < s1 <    < sK = 1:
In this new partition of PJ 1, 1 = 0 and
E~2:n (K)  E~2:n (1)
= E~2:n (K)  E~2:n (1) + E~2:n (1)  E~2:n (1)
< 2E
h
~2:n (K)  ~2:n (1)
i
(E~2:n convex in  & K   1 > 1)
= 2
 
21   2K

(K = 

K & P

J is equilibrium partition)
<
 
21   2K

(21 = 4
2
1 & 
2
1 > 
2
K)
and thus f1
 
PJ 1

> 0. Similarly, from the equilibrium condition, we have for j > 1,
fj
 
PJ 2

= 0, and therefore f
 
PJ 0
  0 as before. Following the similar reasoning,
we can also show that it is also true for the case of J = 2K   1. Therefore, we have
P J 0 < PJ 0 , f (P J 0) < 0 and f
 
PJ 0
  0 for J 0 = J   1 and J   2. By the Intermediate
Value Theorem, there exists a partition of degree J 0, P J 0 , such that f
 
P J 0

= 0. Finally,
by mathematical induction, we get the result.
5.4 Optimal Disclosure Policy
We next investigate the optimal disclosure policy for the seller. We know that in a
m-PBE, all the interim expected revenues are equal, and therefore the ex ante expected
auction revenue in equilibrium is just equal to the interim ones. We denote the ex ante
expected auction revenue in a J-degree m-PBE partition equilibrium by R (J).
The rst question is when revealing information would be protable, if compared with
revealing no information at all. In our model, when the partition degree J = 1, it is
equivalent to revealing null information. The question is then when R (J) > R (1) for
J  2. The advantage of withholding information is that it wont change biddersex ante
expectation of the product attribute, which is 0, the most popular attribute. However, not
revealing product information also implies that bidders face the largest risk of mismatch
between their tastes and the exact product attribute. So the combined e¤ect on expected
auction revenue is mixed. The result below shows that, when the number of bidders is
large enough, it is protable for the seller to reveal product information.
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Lemma 23 There exists a N^ such that, for any n  N^ , revealing product information
generates higher expected auction revenue than withholding information.
Proof. When theres no information disclosure, J = 1 and the mean and variance of the
product attribute in this case is  = 0 and 2 =
R 1
 1 x
2dG (x). Therefore, the expected
revenue is
R (1) = V   
h
2 + E~2:n (0)
i
:
We just need to show that a symmetric partition of J = 2 generates higher expected
revenue than R (1) when n is large enough. When J = 2, then the conditional mean and
variance of product attribute is 1 =
R 1
0 xdG (x jx  0) > 0 and 21 =
R 1
0 x
2dG (x jx  0) 
21 < 
2. And the expected revenue is
R (2) = V   
h
21 + E~2:n (1)
i
:
As E
h
~2:n (1)  ~2:n (0)
i
uniformly converges to zero from Lemma 10, then there exists
an N^ such that, for any n  N^ , 0 < E
h
~2:n (1)  ~2:n (0)
i
< 2  21, which implies that
R (2) > R (1).
When both G (s) and F () follow uniform distribution on S, it follows that N^ = 3.
So in this case, when n  3, it is better for the seller to reveal product information to the
bidders, rather than withhold it. A related yet di¤erent result is reported in Board (2009),
in a reduced-form model. Board (2009) shows that, when biddersvaluation distribution
is symmetric, the seller is indi¤erent between revealing product information or not when
n = 3. This is because, when n = 3, the expectation of the second highest valuation
is just equal to the ex ante expectation of biddersvaluations, and as a result, revealing
information has no impacts on expected auction revenue. The uniform example of our
model shows that, in contrast, when n = 3, the seller strictly prefers revealing product
information, rather than not.
We next turn to a general result of the optimal disclosure policy. The existence
theorem states that, for any given J 2 Z+, there exists an equilibrium partition of degree
J , as long as the number of bidders, n, is su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, for given
n, there exists a maximum degree for equilibrium partition, denoted as J (n), and for any
partition degree J 0  J (n), there also exists an equilibrium partition of degree J 0. And
J (n) is non-decreasing in n.
Roughly speaking, a higher degree equilibrium partition corresponds to ner partition
of the attribute space, and thus more precise signals. And more precise signals correspond
to smaller conditional variances of the product attribute, which raise biddersposterior
valuations. For given n, let J (n) denote the optimal degree of m-PBE partitions,
at which the seller achieves the highest ex ante expected auction revenue. Obviously
J (n)  J (n). The following result shows that when n is large enough, J (n) = J (n).
Theorem 24 When n is large enough, the optimal degree of m-PBE partition J (n) is
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equal to the maximum possible degree of m-PBE partitions, that is,
J (n) = J (n) (19)
Proof. For given n, let us consider two degrees of equilibrium partitions, J^ and J (n)
with J^ < J (n). In equilibrium partition P J , the minimum length of its subintervals is
 K =
1  s K 1, where J = 2 K or 2 K   1. Obviously,  K < 2= J , and the ex ante
expected auction revenue is equal to
R
 
J

= V   

1
12
2K + E~2:n ( K)

:
In equilibrium partition P 
J^
, the maximum length of its subintervals is 1 = ~s1 if J^ = 2K^,
or 1 = 2s^1 if J^ = 2K^   1. And we have 1 > 2=J^ as well, and the ex ante expected
auction revenue is equal to
R

J^

= V   

1
12
21 + E~2:n (^1)

;
and we get
1

h
R
 
J (n)
 RJ^i = h 11221 + E~2:n (^1)i  h 1122K + E~2:n ( K)i
> 13

1
J^2
  1J2

  E
h
~2:n ( K)  ~2:n (^1)
i
;
which is strictly positive for su¢ ciently large n, as E
h
~2:n ( K)  ~2:n (^1)
i
uniformly
converges to 0 when n converges to innity.
The result states that, when n is large enough, it is optimal to select the disclosure
policy corresponding to the largest possible degree of equilibrium partitions, that is, J (n).
The intuition behind this result is similar to that behind the Existence Theorem. When
the number of bidders increases, the di¤erence in popularity across di¤erent product at-
tributes becomes more and more negligible, and signal precision becomes the principle
determinant for auction revenue. In this case, it is better to provide more precise product
information to the bidders.
We already know that J (n) is non-decreasing in n. Then the optimal disclosure policy
then shows a complementarity relationship between the number of bidders and the degree
of optimal equilibrium partitions. Roughly speaking, it implies that when the number of
bidders increases, it is better to reveal more precise production information to the bidders.
This complementarity result looks similar to the results reported in Ganuza (2004) and
Ganuza and Panelva (2010), who also nd that when there are more bidders in an auction,
it is better for the seller to reveal more precise information. However, their results are
derived under the assumption of costly information, that is, it is more costly to reveal more
precise information. If information is costless, that complementarity result disappears,
and the optimal disclosure policy will again be extreme, just as in Lewis and Sappington
(1994), Johnson and Myatt(2006) in monopoly pricing, and Board (2009) and Hummel
25
McAfee (2015) in auction context.
The requirement of n to be large enough is non-trivial, as it is possible for J (n) < J (n)
when n is small. One example is implied in the previous result of Lemma 23. For example,
under our symmetric setting, for any number of n, there always exists an equilibrium
partition of degree J = 2. If both F () and G (s) are uniform distributions, then when
n < 3, J (n) = 1 from Lemma 23, which is strictly smaller than J (n) = 2. Below we
provide a numerical example where both F and G are uniform.
Example 25 Suppose both product attribute and bidders types are uniform distribution
on S = [ 1; 1]. And we can derive the exact results on optimal and maximum equilibrium
partition degree, J (n) and J (n), following similar methods as in Example 15. We
conduct our calculation till n = 22, and the results are as follows
J (n) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
1 if n 2 f1; 2g
2 if n 2 f3;    ; 7g
3 if n 2 f8;    ; 11g
4 if n 2 f12;    ; 17g
5 if n 2 f18;    ; 21g
6 if n = 22
; J (n) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
2 if n 2 f1; 2    ; 5g
3 if n 2 f6;    ; 11g
4 if n 2 f12;    ; 17g
5 if n 2 f18;    ; 21g
6 if n = 22
:
The numerical result shows that J (n), the optimal degree of m-PBE partition, is non-
decreasing in n. And when n  8, J (n) = J (n), as shown in Theorem 24. Figure 3.
below provides an illustration of the numerical results.
Figure 3. an Example of Optimal Information Disclosure
5.5 Informative Equilibria: with Reserve Prices
As shown in Corollary 13, in a standard auction without reserve prices, when n is given,
full information disclosure is not achievable in a m-PBE. Following a similar reasoning as
in Proposition 6, we next show that, if reserve prices are allowed, there full revealing can
be achieved in (m; r)-PBE. The intuition is that, with the additional price instrument,
the seller can adjust the reserve prices such that all the interim expected revenues be
equal. And that interim expected revenue is equal to that for the worst attribute (s = 1)
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with optimal reserve. A di¤erent result from Proposition 6 for VD products is that, in
this case of HD products, when n is su¢ ciently large, full revealing equilibrium generates
higher expected auction revenue than that for null information disclosure.
Proposition 26 For HD products and under cheap-talk, when setting reserve prices is
allowed in standard auctions,
i) There exist fully revealing (m; r)-PBE;
ii) If n is su¢ ciently large, full revealing (m; r)-PBE generates higher expected auction
revenue than null disclosure.
Proof. i) The extreme attribute of s = 1 is the worst attribute, let r (1) be the sellers
optimal reserve price for that attribute. For any other attribute s0 2 S, there exists
a reserve price r (s) such that R (1; r (1) ; 1) = R (s0; r (s0) ; s0), which is always possible
as R (1; r (1) ; 1)  R (s0; r (s0) ; s0) and limr(s0)!V R (s0; r (s0) ; s0) = 0. ii) Under null
disclosure, the expected second highest valuation of the bidders is V   
h
2 + E~2:n (0)
i
which is bounded below V   2. Under full information disclosure, the expected second
highest valuation of the worst attribute s = 1 is V   E~2:n (1). When n ! 1, V  
E~2:n (1) converges to V with probability 1, and therefore, in an auction with optimal
reserve prices, full revealing equilibrium generates higher expected revenue than that of
null disclosure.
6 Horizontally Di¤erentiated Products: Truthful Disclosure
For horizontally di¤erentiated products, we now turn to the case where the seller is com-
mitted to truthful information disclosure. Similar questions have been studied in Ganuza
(2004), Board (2009), Ganuza and Penalva (2010) and Hummel and McAfee (2015), but
the key di¤erence here is that we re-investigate it in a model with endogenous valuations
of the bidders. Our main result is that, in this case of full commitment, when n is large
enough, it is optimal for the seller to reveal full information.
When the seller is committed to a preset disclosure rule, such as (7), the incentive
compatible of (4) at the interim stage is absent in equilibrium. The sellers problem is
thus to maximize the ex ante expected auction revenue R (J) which is
R (J) =
JX
j=1
Pr (mj)R (mj) = E ~m [R (m)] ; (20)
where ~m is the random variable of signal and m is its typical realization.
Proposition 27 For HD products and under truthful disclosure, when n is su¢ ciently
large, full information disclosure is optimal.
Proof. Applying the rule of total variance, we have
Var (~s) = Var ~m [E [~s j ~m ]] + E ~m [Var (~s j ~m)] = Var ~m [~] + E ~m

~2

;
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where ~ = E (~s j ~m) and ~2 = Var (~s j ~m), and Var ~m [~] = E ~m

~2

. Therefore,
E ~m

~2

= Var (~s)  E ~m

~2

:
Substituting back to the expression of R (m) in (11), we then have
R = E ~m [R (m)] = V   E ~m

~2 + E~s [2:n (~)]

= V   Var (~s) + E ~m

~2   E~s [2:n (~)]

:
As limn!1 E~s [2:n (s)] = 0 uniformly, then the function s2   E~s [2:n (s)] is convex when
n is su¢ ciently large. And from Jasens inequality, R achieves its maximum under full
revealing, when n is su¢ ciently large.
This result of full information disclosure is also reported in Board(2009) and Ganuza
and Penalva (2010) in the reduced-form models, where there is no explicit matching be-
tween preference and product attribute. It is also worth noting that the result of full
disclosure in our model does not depend on the specic format of disclosure rules, whether
it is partition or not. We next prove a convergence property of the optimal partition P^ J ,
as below.
Proposition 28 For HD products and under truthful disclosure, when n!1, the opti-
mal partition of P^ J satises
s^j =
1
2
 
^j + ^j+1

; for j = 1; 2;    ;K   1:
Specically, when G (s) is uniform, limn!1 P^ J = P J .
Proof. We have, when n converges to innity,
lim
n!1 [Pr (mj)R (mj) + Pr (mj+1)R (mj+1)]
= (G (sj+1) G (sj 1))V   
"Z sj
sj 1
 
x  j
2
g (x) dx+
Z sj+1
sj
 
x  j+1
2
g (x) dx
#
:
Furthermore, as limn!1R (mj) = V   2j uniformly, then limn!1 @R@sj = @@sj [limn!1R].
It follows that the rst order condition
 1

lim
n!1
@R
@sj
=
h 
sj   j
2    sj   j+12i g (sj) = 0:
As g (sj) > 0, we then get 2s^j = ^j + ^j+1. It is easy to show that s^

j  12

s^j 1 + s^

j+1

under A2. Finally, when G is uniform, j =
1
2 (sj 1 + sj) and the optimal partition P^

J
then converges to equal partition.
28
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper contributes to a large existing literature on information disclosure in auctions
but it is among the rst, and only, to study cheap talk information disclosure (Li (2012)).
We investigate how an informed seller may reveal information to bidders through parti-
tional cheap-talk, prior to a standard auction. We show that this cheap sales talk has
quite di¤erent implications for VD and HD products. In the case of VD products, we
re-examine the general symmetric model of MW (1982) and conrm that seller optimal
cheap talk equilibria convey no information to bidders whether or no sellers may also set
reserve prices.
In the case of HD products, we prove that, for given partition degree J , a message-
only informative equilibrium can always be supported by a partition of degree J , as long
as the number of bidders is su¢ ciently large. On the other hand, we also show that,
for given number of bidders n, there exists a maximum partition degree J (n), below
which a message-only informative equilibrium can be supported, and that J (n) is non-
decreasing in n. Equilibria have the feature that more precise information is revealed for
less popular product attributes. We show that the seller optimal disclosure policy displays
a complementarity between the number of bidders and the optimal amount of product
information disclosed to the bidders.
We also consider the impacts of setting reserve prices on the equilibrium outcomes,
and show that in contrast to the case of VD products, a full-revealing equilibrium for
HD products can result in higher revenue level than null information with optimal reserve
price, as long as the number of bidders is su¢ ciently large.
The paper also introduces what might prove to be a useful methodological tool: in
the proof of the existence theorem, we adopt the Intermediate Value Theorem dened on
partially ordered sets (Guillerme, 1995), rather than a xed point theorem.
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